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Abstract
The existence of lawsuits providing plaintiffs a negative expected value (NEV) at trial has
important theoretical implications for signaling models of litigation. The signaling equilibrium
possible absent NEV suits breaks down with NEV suits because plaintiffs do not have a credible
threat to proceed to trial undermining the ability to signal type. Using a laboratory experiment, we
analyze behavior with and without the possibility of NEV suits. Absent NEV suits, behavior
largely follows predicted patterns. However, the possibility of NEV suits does not cause the
signaling equilibrium to unravel and does not cause the dispute rate to increase. Plaintiffs only
drop NEV lawsuits three-fourths of the time, the rejection rate by defendants for revealing
demands rises less than predicted and, contra theory, the rejection rate on demands in the semipooling range remains unchanged.
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1. Introduction
When the expected cost of proceeding to trial exceeds the expected judgment at trial, a plaintiff is
said to have a negative expected value (NEV) suit. There is an extensive theoretical literature on
NEV suits which suggests that they can raise the incidence of costly trials in the presence of
asymmetric information. We provide the first controlled laboratory experiment exploring the
effects of NEV suits in a setting with asymmetric information. We do this in the context of a
signaling game, in which the informed party makes a pre-trial demand on the uninformed party.
Compared to treatments in which all suits have positive expected value (PEV) for the plaintiff, we
find important changes in the direction predicted by theory under the NEV treatment although the
magnitude of these changes is much smaller than predicted. However, contrary to the predictions
of theory, we do not observe a total breakdown of the signaling equilibrium. In addition, the overall
dispute rate falls in the NEV treatment, in contrast to the prediction that it would increase.
Our experiment is based on a two-type version of the Reinganum and Wilde (1986)
signaling model of litigation. In two treatments both high type, AH, and low type, AL, plaintiffs
have PEV suits, where plaintiff type is associated with whether the plaintiff would receive a high
or low award at trial. In our NEV treatment, the AL plaintiff has an NEV suit, while AH continues
to have a PEV suit. In all of our treatments, if an offer is rejected, the plaintiff has an opportunity
to drop the suit and is predicted to do so if and only if she has an NEV suit. Theoretical results
from Farmer and Pecorino (2007) show that the possibility of NEV suits causes the signaling
equilibrium to unravel. Among other predictions, in the NEV treatment all plaintiff demands are
expected to be rejected. Thus, in that treatment all AL type plaintiffs end up dropping their cases
while all AH type plaintiffs proceed to trial so that the overall dispute rate equals the proportion of
AH type plaintiffs. By contrast, when all plaintiffs have PEV suits, some plaintiffs of both types
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are predicted to settle and the overall dispute rate is predicted to be, at least weakly, lower than in
the NEV treatment.
As predicted by theory, behavior in the two PEV treatments is quite similar, while behavior
in the NEV treatment differs substantially from the other two treatments. Several of the changes
we observe are in the direction predicted by the theory, but the magnitudes of these changes are
smaller than predicted. First, AL plaintiffs, who, as predicted, rarely drop their case in the PEV
treatments, drop their case about 75% of the time in the face of a rejection in the NEV treatment,
where the theoretical prediction is 100%. Second, revealing demands by AL plaintiffs are about 25
percentage points more likely to be rejected in the NEV treatment than in the other treatments.
These rejection rates rise from about 15% in the two PEV treatments to about 40% in the NEV
treatment, whereas the theoretical prediction is that the rejection rate increases from 0% to 100%. 1
However, in one important dimension, a predicted change is not observed. Specifically, the
rejection rate on demands in the semi-pooling region, associated with all AH plaintiffs as well as
bluffing AL plaintiffs, are essentially unchanged in the NEV treatment as compared to the PEV
treatments. These rejection rates range from 74% to 80% across the three treatments and are not
statistically different from one another. Since most AL plaintiffs drop their suit in the face of
rejection in the NEV treatment and because high demands face no higher a rejection rate than in
the other treatments, we do not observe an overall increase in the dispute rate when NEV suits are
possible. On the contrary, we find dispute rates to be significantly lower in this setting.
While our results provide support for some key predictions of a signaling model with NEV
suits, we do not observe a total breakdown of the signaling equilibrium. Part of the reason for this

1

Under the theory, low revealing demands should be accepted 100% of the time in the PEV treatments. However,
excess disputes, that is, disputes not predicted by the theory are common in settings such as this. Pecorino and Van
Boening (2018) report dispute rates of 10% for low type, revealing demands. See their Table 5.
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is that 25% of the cases in which a demand is rejected and the plaintiff has an NEV suit proceed
to trial. This, in turn, weakens defendant’s incentive to reject all demands. One possible motivation
for AL plaintiffs with an NEV suit proceeding to trial in the face of rejection is spite (Guha 2016,
2019). We explore the counterintuitive result that spite can increase settlement after presenting our
empirical results.

2. Background
NEV suits can arise from a case that has merit, but for which the stakes are so small relative to the
costs of going to trial that it is unprofitable for the plaintiff to proceed. Alternatively, NEV suits
can arise from nuisance suits, which are suits without any merit. Regardless of the merit of NEV
suits, there is a consistent implication from the theoretical literature that such suits can raise the
overall dispute rate, quite possibly by a large amount.
In Bebchuk (1984), an uninformed plaintiff makes a settlement demand to an informed
defendant. For this screening model, Bebchuk assumes that all plaintiffs have PEV suits; however,
Nalebuff (1987) extends the model to consider plaintiffs with NEV suits. Under the equilibrium
derived by Bebchuk (1984), a plaintiff might find that she does not have a credible threat to proceed
to trial in the face of a rejection. The reason is that defendants with weak cases accept the settlement
demand, leaving stronger defendants to proceed to trial. It cannot be an equilibrium for the plaintiff
to drop the suit in the face of rejection, because then all defendants would reject the settlement
demand. This forces the plaintiff to make a more aggressive equilibrium offer which is rejected by
a wider range of defendants. This increases the plaintiff’s expected payoff at trial among the
defendants who reject, but also results in more trials. Hence, the presence of NEV plaintiff types
may lead to increased disputes.
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Bebchuk (1988) is also a screening model, but it posits that an uninformed defendant makes
an offer to an informed plaintiff, where some fraction of these plaintiffs have NEV suits. If the
fraction of plaintiffs with NEV suits is sufficiently high, the equilibrium changes from an interior
one with substantial settlement to one where the defendant offers 0 and thereby takes all PEV
plaintiffs to trial. This may be done because the defendant knows all NEV plaintiffs will drop their
case prior to trial, resulting in a 0 cost for the defendant. By contrast, at the interior equilibrium,
NEV plaintiffs receive and accept a positive settlement offer. Katz (1990) adds a filing decision to
the model which leads to a mixed strategy equilibrium, but the implication that NEV suits can
greatly increase the incidence of trial is preserved.
Reinganum and Wilde (1986) develop the signaling model of litigation in which the
informed plaintiff makes a demand on an uninformed defendant assuming all plaintiffs have PEV
suits. They use a refinement concept to eliminate all but a pure strategy separating equilibrium
with a one-to-one mapping between a plaintiff’s type (which reflects the judgement they would
receive at trial) and the settlement demand. Farmer and Pecorino (2007) take the same model, but
allow for some plaintiffs to have NEV suits. They find that the pure strategy equilibrium is totally
unraveled and is replaced by an equilibrium under which all demands are rejected. An equilibrium
with settlement is restored only when a filing fee is added to the model, but unless this fee is large,
the potential presence of NEV suits will lead to a large increase in the dispute rate. 2

2

There are other notable works on NEV suits, such as Sobel (1989), who analyzes a model with two-sided
asymmetric information. In one case he considers, one plaintiff type has an NEV suit and as a result, the rejection
rate rises to 100%. There is also an extensive literature on NEV suits with symmetric information. Rosenberg and
Shavell (1985) argue that the defendant may make a payment to a plaintiff with a nuisance suit in order to avoid the
cost of a formal legal response. Bebchuk (1996) shows how a plaintiff with an NEV suit can have a credible threat
to proceed to trial if costs are divisible and incurred gradually over time. On this issue, also see Klement (2003) and
Schwartz and Wickelgren (2009). Farmer and Pecorino (1998) consider nuisance suits in a repeated game setting
and find that lawyers can develop a reputation for taking such suits to trial in the face of a rejection. Chen (2006)
argues that the use of contingency fee contracts can facilitate the success of nuisance suits. Other notable papers in
the literature include Rosenberg and Shavell (2006) and Miceli and Stone (2014).
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While there has been an extensive amount of experimental work analyzing the litigation
process, relatively little of this work has focused on asymmetric information. 3 Stanley and Coursey
(1990) use an experiment to explore the Priest and Klein (1984) hypothesis where there is twosided asymmetric information (see also Inglis et al. 2005). Sullivan (2016) is an experimental test
of the Spier (1992) model in which there are multiple bargaining periods. Previous experimental
work on the signaling model includes Pecorino and Van Boening (2018, 2019a, 2019b) and
Solomon (2022). 4 While these authors find some anomalous behavior, the experimental results are
broadly in line with the predictions of theory. In particular, behavior of subjects in these
experiments is roughly consistent with a semi-pooling equilibrium under which some AL plaintiffs
make a low revealing demand while others bluff by making a demand similar to those made by AH
plaintiffs.

3. The Model
We utilize a two-type version of the Reinganum and Wilde (1986) signaling model augmented to
consider NEV suits as in Farmer and Pecorino (2007) in which player A has initiated litigation
against player B. Thus, player A is the plaintiff and player B is the defendant. The plaintiff’s type,
Ai, i = H,L, is determined by nature and fully revealed at trial where the monetary judgment will
be Ji, where JH > JL. The ex-ante probability that player A‘s type is AH equals p. Each party bears
their own costs at trial, CA and CB, respectively. The game proceeds as follows:
Stage 1. Nature determines player A’s type (AH or AL), where AH is chosen with
probability p. Player A knows her type, while player B only knows the probability each
type is chosen.
3
An important strand of work which does not incorporate asymmetric information concerns self-serving bias.
Babcock and Lowenstein (1997) provide a review of this literature.
4
Pecorino and Van Boening (2019a) analyzes costly voluntary disclosures in a signaling game, while Pecorino and
Van Boening (2019b) analyzes a costly discovery procedure. Solomon (2022) considers how role switching
(between the plaintiff and defendant roles) may facilitate learning with the signaling model of litigation.
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Stage 2. Player A makes the settlement demand S to player B.
Stage 3. Player B decides to accept or reject the demand.
-If it is accepted, the game ends. Player A’s payoff is S and player B’s payoff is –S.
-If the demand is rejected, the game proceeds to stage 4.
Stage 4. Player A decides to either drop the case or continue to trial.
-If she drops the case, each player receives a payoff of 0.
-If she continues, the game proceeds to stage 5.
Stage 5. At trial, a plaintiff of type Ai with i ∈{H, L} receives the monetary award Ji. The
plaintiff’s payoff is Ji – CA and the defendant’s payoff is – (Ji+CB).

In order to focus attention on an interesting case, we derive a parameter restriction that
allows us to eliminate the possibility of a pure strategy pooling equilibrium. If there is a dispute,
AH would receive a payoff of JH – CA. If the pooling demand S is accepted, AH receives S. Under
the lowest possible pooling demand, S = JH – CA. Player B would reject this demand if JH– CA ≥
p(JH +CB) + (1-p)(JL +CB), where the right-hand side of this expression is player B’s expected
cost at trial when a pooling demand is rejected. If player B rejects the lowest possible pooling
demand, player B will reject all possible pooling demands. Rearranging our expression we can
conclude that pooling is not possible if

(1 − p )( J H − J L ) ≥ C A + CB .

(1)

We assume this parameter restriction holds and will focus on semi-pooling equilibria, assuming
initially that AL has a credible threat to proceed to trial if her demand is rejected. The low revealing
demand SL is given by (2a). The high demand associated with a pure strategy separating
equilibrium, SH, is given by (2b). The entire range of high semi-pooling demands, SSP is given by
(2c).
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L
S=
J L + CB ,

(2a)

H
S=
J H + CB .

(2b)

SH – CA – CB ≤ SSP ≤ SH

(2c)

Note that the demand in (2a) extracts B’s dispute cost conditional on facing AL and that the demand
in (2b) extracts the dispute cost conditional on facing AH. In the pure strategy separating
equilibrium, AL makes the demand in (2a) and AH makes the demand in (2b). In a semi-pooling
equilibrium, all AH make a semi-pooling demand SSP within the range in (2c) and some AL players
bluff by making this same demand. Note that the demand associated with a pure strategy separating
equilibrium, SH is the limiting case of the semi-pooling demands. Thus, our consideration of semipooling includes the pure strategy separating equilibrium as a special case. 5
In a semi-pooling equilibrium, the high demand must be rejected with a sufficiently high
probability φ so as to make AL indifferent between making the high demand, SSP, and the revealing
low demand, SL. This rejection rate must satisfy the following:

J L + CB =(1 − φ ) S SP + φ ( J L − C A ) .
Solving the previous expression for the rejection rate φ, yields

S SP − [ J L + CB ]
.
φ = SP
S − [ J L − CA ]

(3)

5

Data from previous experiments, for example, Pecorino and Van Boening (2018) and Solomon (2022), are more
consistent with a semi-pooling equilibrium, than with a pure strategy separating equilibrium. Demands in the
neighborhood of SH tend to be rejected at a 100% rate and as a result, most AH players make more moderate
demands within the semi-pooling range.
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This rejection rate is increasing in the size of the semi-pooling demand.
In the semi-pooling equilibrium, AL bluffs with probability Ω, where this bluffing
probability makes B indifferent between accepting and rejecting SSP. The probability that AL bluffs
is

 p   S H − S SP 
Ω =
.
  SP
L 
 1 − p  S − S 

(4)

Note that Ω is decreasing in SSP. In the limiting case of the pure strategy separating equilibrium,
SSP = SH and Ω = 0.
The credibility constraint for AL is JL – CA ≥ 0. When this condition holds, she is willing to
proceed to trial in the face of a rejected demand. In our treatments with only PEV suits, this
constraint holds and the semi-pooling equilibria we have described in this section provide the range
of predicted outcomes in the experiment. When this condition is violated, AL has an NEV suit and
an AL player is always predicted to drop the suit in the face of rejection. If the demand SL is made,
player B now rejects it, knowing that AL will subsequently drop the suit. If the demand SSP is
accepted with a positive probability, then all AL will make this demand, because they earn 0 by
revealing their type with the low demand. Thus, SSP must be rejected at the rate of 100%. This, in
turn, causes any potential signaling equilibria to break down with the result that player B rejects
all demands in equilibrium (Farmer and Pecorino 2007).
As noted previously, the lowest pooling demand that AH would accept is S = JH – CA. Now,
if this demand is rejected, all AL drop the suit, so if JH– CA ≥ p(JH + CB), pooling is not possible.
This may be expressed as

(1 − p ) J H ≥ C A + pCB .

(5)
8

If (1) holds, then equation (5) will also hold and when it does, we cannot have a pure strategy
pooling equilibrium with NEV suits. As noted above, we also cannot have a semi-pooling
equilibrium with a positive rate of settlement. All AL drop their case in the face of a rejection and
all AH proceed to trial. The dispute rate for AH rises to 100% whereas this dispute rate is φ < 1 in a
semi-pooling equilibrium, when the credibility constraint holds and where φ is given by (3). When
AL cannot credibly proceed to trial, it is consistent with equilibrium for all AL to pool on the demand
made by AH within the semi-pooling range and for B to reject all such demands. 6

4. Experimental Design
4.1 Treatments
To explore how the potential for NEV suits affects disputes empirically, we rely on a
laboratory experiment. The laboratory provides an idealized setting to test the theoretical model
described in the previous section because it affords control of the underlying parameters whereas
these values are unobservable in natural settings. Specially, we employ a within-subject
experimental design with three treatments: PEV, NEV, and PEV+. Unless otherwise noted, all
monetary amounts below are stated in terms of experimental dollars where 1000 experimental
dollars equals $US 1. Player A’s earnings equaled the sum of the payoffs from each individual
round. Player B’s earnings equaled a lump sum endowment minus the sum of the costs from each

6

Other equilibria are possible, but there must be a sufficient degree of pooling of AL with AH within the semipooling range such that player B is induced to reject all such demands. To avoid the tedious exercise of delineating
all of these possibilities, we will focus on the equilibrium under which 100% of AL players bluff by mimicking AH
behavior.

9

individual round. The lump sum was 21,000.7 The average salient payoff was $US 9.03 and all
subjects also received an additional $US 5 show-up payment.
In all three treatments, the probability player A’s type is AH is p = 1/3. The dispute costs
are CA = CB = 100. PEV serves as the baseline and imposes JH = 450 and JL = 150. As such, player
A should always proceed to trial if her initial demand is rejected because JH – CA > JL – CA > 0.
NEV is the main treatment of interest with JH and JL shifted down by 100 relative to PEV, so that
JH = 350 and JL = 50. As a result, JH – CA > 0 > JL – CA. This implies that AH has a credible threat
to proceed to trial but that AL does not. Thus, AL should drop her suit in the face of a rejection in
the NEV treatment and the signaling equilibrium is predicted to breakdown entirely. As a result,
player B rejects all demands with AL subsequently dropping their suit and 100% of AH players
proceeding to trial.
The PEV+ treatment is a control for the effect of shifting values with JH and JL shifted up
by 100 relative to PEV, so that JH = 550 and JL = 250. As in PEV, in PEV+ both player A types
should proceed to trial in the face of a rejected demand. The range of semi-pooling demands in
PEV+ is shifted up by 100 relative to PEV. Adjusting for the shift, semi-pooling demands are
predicted to be rejected at the same rate in these two treatments. For example, a semi-pooling
demand of 400 in PEV corresponds to a semi-pooling demand of 500 in PEV+ and from equation
(3) both of these demands are predicted to be rejected with a probability of 43%. Of course, it is
possible that behavior is consistent with different semi-pooling equilibria in the PEV and PEV+
treatments or that behavior differs in other ways between the two treatments. If behavior does
differ between the PEV and PEV+ treatments, it would call into question whether behavioral

7

The lump sum is revealed to B, but not to A. Theoretically it does not matter whether or not the lump sum is
revealed, but behaviorally it might. In the field, the plaintiff is unlikely to have precise knowledge of the defendant’s
wealth.
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differences between the PEV and NEV treatments are due to the presence of NEV suits or the shift
in values. However, if behavior is similar in the PEV and PEV+ treatments, it suggests differences
between the PEV and NEV treatments are attributable to the possibility of NEV suits in the latter.
Table 1 summarizes the theoretical predictions for each treatment. Many of the predictions
in this table are generated via equations (3) and (4). However, the “predicted” range for revealing
demands warrants specific mention and is based on equation (2a). Strictly speaking, AL should
demand JL + CB, claiming all of the available surplus, but previous litigation experiments, and
ultimatum game experiments more generally, consistently find people are willing to share surplus.
For this reason, the ranges for revealing demands shown in the table include all demands that yield
positive surplus to both parties when the outcome is JL. 8

Table 1. Theoretical Prediction by Treatment
Treatment
Values of JH , JL
Predicted Range of Demands by Player A
if AH or Bluffing AL
if Revealing AL
Probability of Bluffing by AL
Predicted Rejection Rate by Payer B of Demands
if revealing AL
if in semi-pooling range
Predicted Dispute Rate following Rejection
if AH
if AL
Unconditional Dispute Rate

NEV
350, 50

PEV
450, 150

PEV+
550, 250

[250,450]a
[0,150]a
100%

[350, 550]
[50, 250]
0% - 100%

[450, 650]
[150, 350]
0% - 100%

100%
100%

0%
33% - 60%

0%
33% - 60%

100%
0%
33%

100%
100%
20% - 33%

100%
100%
20% - 33%

a

For NEV, player B should reject any positive demand. Player A demands should be concentrated in the semipooling range. However, for the purpose of making comparisons to the other treatments demands in the range of
[0,150] are treated as AL revealing demands. The range is not [-50,150] because negative demands are not allowed.
Similarly, player A demands in NEV in the range of [250,450] are treated as being in the semi-pooling range.

8

The range of revealing demands for the NEV treatment also reflect the limitation that subjects could not make
negative demands.
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As shown in Table 1, the predictions for PEV and PEV+ are identical accounting for the
shift of 100 in JH and JL. As described in the previous section, there are multiple semi-pooling
equilibria in the PEV and PEV+ treatments. However, when comparing the PEV and NEV
predictions it is clear that bluffing should be at least as common in NEV as in the other treatments,
while player B’s rate of rejecting demands should be at least as high as in the other treatments.

4.2 Procedures
Each laboratory session lasted about one hour and involved eight subjects who were randomly
assigned to the role of player A or player B. 9 All subjects maintained their assigned role
throughout the session. A session involved 36 decision periods broken into blocks of 12 periods
per treatment. To control for order effects, two sessions were conducted under each possible
treatment ordering. In each period of each session, subjects were randomly and anonymously
paired with a subject in the opposite role. Within a period, each pair of subjects proceeded through
the stages of the game shown in the previous section; however, the wording in the experiment
replaced loaded terms such as “trial” and “demand” with more neutral terms such as “verification”
and “request,” respectively. 10
After each period, both subjects in a bargaining pair learn A’s payoff and B’s cost for the
round. A history table provided all of the information that a player had observed in previous
rounds, but information that was not revealed in a period was not included in the history table. For
example, player B only learned if player A was bluffing if the pair actually reached Stage 5.

9
Previous economics experiments have found that a group of size four is typically sufficient to yield noncooperative behavior (e.g. Huck et al. 2004).
10
There are litigation experiments, such as those surveyed in Babcock and Loewenstein (1997), in which context is
integral to the experiment. Generally, however, tests of litigation theory have been conducted in a context free
environment (Landeo 2015). Cardella and Kitchens (2017) run a litigation experiment both with and without legal
context and do not find statistically significant differences in their results.

12

The experiment was conducted at The University of Alabama’s TIDE Lab and
computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The 96 subjects (= 8 subjects / session × 2 sessions
/ treatment order × 6 treatment orders) were recruited from the lab’s standing pool of student
volunteers. While some subjects had participated in other studies, none had participated in any
related study in the lab. Upon entering the lab, subjects provided informed consent to participate
in the study. Participants in a session were brought en masse to one of the lab’s computer rooms
and were seated at separate, visually isolated workstations where they received a pencil, a
calculator, and a paper copy of the instructions. The instructions were also displayed on the
subject’s computer screen throughout the experiment. After the subjects were seated, a researcher
read the instructions aloud and provided an opportunity for subjects to ask questions. A short
comprehension quiz was then administered before the paid portion of the study began. Copies of
the instruction and the quiz can be found in Appendix A.

5. Behavioral Results
Our data consists of 1728 interactions equally split among the three treatments. We begin
with a general overview of the behavioral patterns and then provide statistical analysis of the
treatment effects. Table 2 and Figure 1 provide a basic summary of the data. In Figure 1,
“Between” refers to the range of demands falling strictly between the revealing range and the semipooling range. 11 “Above” (“Below”) refers to the region above (below) the semi-pooling
(revealing) region. 12 As indicated by Figure 1, almost 90% of player A demands are in either the

11
Between demands are below AH’s dispute payoff, so she should never make such a demand. These demands are
above B’s dispute cost against AL, so he should always rejected such a demand. Hence, AL should never make such a
demand. The logic here reflects a refinement known as the ‘test of dominated strategies’ (Kreps 1990: 436).
However, Pecorino and Van Boening (2018) and Solomon (2022) have documented that ‘between’ demands are
made and are sometimes accepted.
12
There is no Below region for NEV as demands were required to be nonnegative.
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semi-pooling or revealing regions. Further, player Bs do not accept demands in the “above” region
(i.e. they do not accept demands larger than the maximum payment from a dispute). Together,
these patterns suggest subjects understood the structure and incentives of the experiment.
Table 2. Summary of Observations by Treatment
Treatment
Number of Interactions
Percent of Player A Demands
in Semi-pooling Range when Outcome is H
in Revealing Range when Outcome is L
in Semi-Pooling Range when Outcome is L
Rejection Rate by Payer B of Demands
if Demand in Revealing Range
if Demand in Semi-Pooling Range
Dispute Rate by Player A following Rejection
if outcome is H

if outcome is L
Unconditional Dispute Rate

NEV
576

PEV
576

PEV+
576

89.13%
57.65%
28.83%

91.98%
61.84%
22.95%

86.87%
65.08%
21.69%

40.17%
n = 234
74.01%
n = 277

13.90%
n = 259
73.77%
n = 244

15.60%
n = 250
79.53%
n = 254

99.29%
n = 141

100%
n = 122

100%
n = 155

24.15%
n = 207
32.99%

88.73%
n = 142
43.06%

92.68%
n = 123
46.70%

For NEV, player B should reject any positive demand. Player A demands should be concentrated in the semipooling range, but are otherwise indeterminate. However, for the purpose of making comparisons to the other
treatments, demands in the range of [0,150] are treated as being analogous to a revealing demand by AL. The range
is not [-50,150] because negative demands are not allowed. Similarly, for NEV player A demands in the range of
[250,450] are treated as being in the semi-pooling range. The denominators for player B rejection rates do not sum
to the total number of observations (576) because 12-13% of player A demands fall outside the predicted ranges.
Similarly, the sum of the denominators for player A dispute rates following rejection do not match the sum of the
numerators for player B rejections.

The overall dispute rate is 43% in PEV and about 47% in PEV+, but only 33% in NEV.
The proportion of interactions that result in disputes in NEV is similar to the theoretical prediction,
but the dispute rates in the other two treatments are substantially greater than predicted. As a result,
the incidence of disputes falls rather than rises in the NEV treatment. The difference in dispute
rates between NEV and either PEV or PEV+ is statistically significant while the difference between
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the dispute rates in PEV and PEV+ is not statistically significant. 13 Figure 1 shows that rejection
of a demand almost always leads to dispute in PEV and PEV+ as predicted. From Table 2 it is clear
that AH players also dispute a rejection in NEV, consistent with the model. However for NEV, the
model predicts AL players will always drop their case after a rejection, while the observed rate is
only 75%.
Player B rejects demands consistent with bluffing about 75% - 80% of the time, regardless
of treatment. This rejection rate is higher than the prediction for PEV and PEV+ as equation (3)
indicates the highest semi-pooling demand should be rejected only 60% of the time. By contrast,
the observed rate is lower than the 100% prediction for NEV. As predicted, revealing demands in
PEV and PEV+ are generally accepted as the rejection rate in this region is only about 15%. For
NEV, revealing demands are rejected 40% of the time, which represents a substantial increase in
comparison to the other treatments, but which is far below the prediction of 100%. Thus, we
observe a treatment effect in the direction predicted, but the size of the effect is much smaller than
predicted. The greater than expected rate at which AL players with an NEV suit proceed with a
dispute after experiencing a rejection is consistent with a weakened incentive to reject revealing
demands. Relatedly, the lack of an increase in B’s rejection rate for demands in the semi-pooling
range may reflect the fact that signaling does not entirely breakdown, with a substantial fraction
of AL players continuing to make revealing demands that are more likely to be accepted than was
predicted. There is an increase in bluffing by AL in the NEV treatment, but the magnitude of the
increase is much smaller than predicted. In particular, in the PEV and PEV+ treatments, the bluffing
rate is about 22.5% while in NEV it increases to 29% versus a predicted value of 100%.
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Our conclusions on statistical significance are derived from a probit regression using individual fixed effects and
standard errors clustered by Session. We can reject at the 1% level the hypotheses that dispute rates are equal in
NEV and PEV or NEV and PEV+. The p-value for the test that PEV and PEV+ have the same rejection rate is 0.232.
The regression results are available upon request.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Outcomes by Treatment
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Before proceeding to our statistical analysis, we note that Table 2 and Figure 1 suggest that
behavior in PEV and PEV+ is indistinguishable. This similarity is borne out statistically as shown
below and indicates that merely shifting the values of JH and JL uniformly does not cause behavior
to change substantially. Rather the differences between NEV and the treatments with only positive
expected value suits are being driven by the introduction of negative expected value suits in the
NEV treatment.
5.1 Analysis of Player A Dispute Behavior
We do not offer statistical analysis of the AH decision to dispute a rejection (i.e., proceed
to trial) as Table 2 reveals there was only a single instance among 418 opportunities across the
three treatments where a rejection was not disputed. Clearly, there is no evidence of a difference
in behavior across treatments for AH post rejection. However, for AL there is a difference in the
dispute rate following a rejection as shown in Table 3. For this analysis, the unit of observation is
AL experiencing a rejection and the dependent variable is an indicator function that the subject
disputes the rejection. The probit analysis controls for treatment order and includes subject level
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fixed effects while standard errors are clustered at the session level. Table 3 contains two
specifications. Specification (1) is a simple comparison of the treatments, while specification (2)
includes the Demand amount, standardized to account for the shift in JL and JH across treatments.
Including Demand identifies whether the size of the surplus player A sought to obtain impacts
player A’s decision to dispute a rejection.
Table 3. Analysis of Dispute Rate following Rejection when Outcome is L
(1)
1.23***
(0.30)
-0.01
(0.49)
-2.67***
(0.43)

Constant
PEV+
NEV

472

(2)
1.30***
(.27)
0.32
(0.50)
-2.77***
(0.41)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.00**
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
472

<0.001

<0.001

Demand
Demand × PEV+
Demand × NEV
Observations
p-value for Ho:
PEV+ = NEV

Estimation is based on probit regression. Demand is the amount of the initial demand made by player A,
standardized so that 0 is the midpoint between the revealing and semi-pooling ranges. Dummy variables for the
treatment order and subject fixed effects are included in the specification, but not displayed in the table. Standard
errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered at the session level. *,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%,5%,
and 1% level, respectively. p-values in the lower portion of the table are for tests against the two-sided alternative.

Evidence for the similarity between PEV and PEV+ is provided by the lack of significance
for the PEV+ term in both specifications. However, the NEV term is negative and significant in
both specifications indicating disputes, conditional on a rejection, are less likely in NEV than in
PEV. Further, the hypothesis that PEV+ = NEV is rejected as shown in the lower portion of the
table indicating that a dispute following a rejection is less likely in NEV than in PEV+. Finally, we
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note that the amount demanded does not significantly affect whether AL disputes a rejection, except
in PEV+ where disputes are slightly less likely to occur the greater the demand.
5.2 Analysis of Player B Rejection Behavior
To determine how the treatment affects B’s decision to reject a demand, we rely on the
probit analysis presented in Table 4. The dependent variable is an indicator for whether B accepted
the demand or not. As before, the analysis controls for treatment order and includes subject level
fixed effects while standard errors are clustered at the session level. Table 4 provides separate
analysis for revealing demands and for demands in the semi-pooling range. Additionally, separate
analysis is presented with and without controlling for the amount demanded.
Table 4. Analysis of Rejection Rates

Constant
PEV+
NEV
Demand

(1)
1.43***
(0.09)
0.07
(0.11)
1.22***
(0.22)
-

Demand × PEV+

-

Demand × NEV

-

Range of Demand
Observations
p-value for Ho:
PEV+ = NEV
Demand × PEV+ = Demand × NEV = 0

(2)
-2.62***
(0.36)
-0.22
(.43)
1.15
(0.94)
0.01***
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.01)

743

SemiPooling
775

(4)
-0.11
(0.20)
-0.04
(0.23)
0.09
(0.21)
0.01***
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)
SemiPooling
775

0.172
0.782

0.211
-

0.698
0.264

Revealing

Revealing

743
<0.001
-

(3)
0.61***
(0.12)
0.183
(0.13)
-0.03
(0.11)
-

Estimation is based on probit regression. Demand is the amount of the initial demand made by player A,
standardized so that 0 is two hundred below the upper bound of the relevant range. Dummy variables for the
treatment order and subject fixed effects are included in the specification, but not displayed in the table. Standard
errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered at the session level. *,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%,5%,
and 1% level, respectively. p-values in the lower portion of the table are for tests against the two-sided alternative.

18

We first note that the coefficient on PEV+ in all four specifications and the coefficient on
Demand × PEV+ in both of the specifications in which it appears are not statistically different from
0, providing further evidence that behavior is similar in PEV and PEV+. Turning to how the
possibility of negative expected value suits impacts behavior, the lack of significance for the
coefficients on NEV (as well at the failure to reject Ho: PEV+ = NEV as shown in the lower portion
of the table) in specifications (3) and (4) indicates that rejection rates for demands in the semipooling range are similar across treatments, as previously suggested by Table 2. The positive and
significant coefficient for NEV (as well at the rejection of Ho: PEV+ = NEV) in specification (1),
indicates that revealing demands are more likely to be rejected in NEV, as previously suggested
by Table 2. It is worth noting that the coefficient for NEV is not statistically significant in
specification (2), which controls for the demand amount, but it is very similar in magnitude to
specification (1).
For both the revealing and semi-pooling ranges, the analysis shows a strong, significant
effect of player A’s demand on player B’s decision to reject it. Interestingly, this response to the
demand does not vary by treatment as evidenced by the lack of significance for the relevant
interaction terms and the joint test in the lower portion of the table. That player Bs are more likely
to reject the greater the demanded amount in the semi-pooling range is consistent with the theory
given the continuum of semi-pooling equilibria, at least for PEV and PEV+. Standard theory
suggests the amount of the demand within the revealing range should not affect player B’s
acceptance behavior, but behaviorally it does. This is consistent with a demand for fairness on the
part of player B such that he is unwilling to accept demands which provide too small a portion of
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the surplus from settlement. Such a demand for fairness has been well documented in the
ultimatum game literature. 14
5.3 Analysis of Player A Demands
To compare demands across treatments, we rely upon the analysis in Table 5. In this
analysis, the dependent variable is the amount demanded by player A. As before, the analysis
controls for treatment order and includes subject level fixed effects while standard errors are
clustered at the session level. The variable High is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 when
the outcome is H and is 0 otherwise.
Table 5. Analysis of Initial Demands

Constant
High
PEV+
NEV
High × PEV+
High × NEV
A Types
Range
Observations
p-value for Ho:
PEV+ = 100
NEV = – 100
PEV+ + High × PEV+ = 100
NEV + High × NEV = -100

(1)
263.94***
(8.76)
197.94***
(11.06)
94.85***
(17.02)
-78.80***
(18.09)
4.34
(20.29)
-32.69*
(17.16)
Both
Unrestricted
1728
0.762
0.241
0.923
0.089

(2)
213.67***
(4.59)
-

AL only
Revealing
728

(3)
404.50***
(7.01)
59.15***
(9.00)
120.14***
(10.16)
-101.69***
(9.43)
-26.48**
(13.30)
-8.04
(10.21)
Both
Semi-pooling
775

0.705
0.860
-

0.048
0.858
0.190
0.112

97.21***
(7.38)
-102.22***
(12.55)
-

Dummy variables for the treatment order and subject fixed effects are included in the specification, but not
displayed in the table. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered at the session level. *,**, and *** denote
significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. p-values in the lower portion of the table are for tests
against the two-sided alternative.

14

For a review of this literature, see Güth and Kocher (2014).
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Specification (1) of Table 5 considers all demands made by all players A. The results
from this specification indicate that overall, AH players adjust their demands almost exactly with
the shift in the value of JH. Specifically, when changing from PEV to PEV+, JH increases by 100
and demands increase by 94.85 + 4.34 = 99.19, which is not statistically different from 100 as
shown in the lower portion of the table. Similarly, when changing from PEV to NEV, JH
decreases by 100 and demands change by –78.80 – 32.69 = –111.49, which is not significantly
different from –100 as shown in the lower portion of the table. Similarly, AL players respond to
the increase in JL when moving from PEV to PEV+ with an approximately one-to-one change in
demand. As shown in the lower portion of the table, the coefficient for PEV+ is not statistically
different from 100.
The decrease in JL when moving from PEV to NEV reduces the average demand by
–78.80. While this is not statistically different from –100, the point estimate is further away from
its predicted value than the other cases considered above. Part of the reason the shift in average
demands for AL players may be less than the change in JL when moving from PEV to NEV is that
these players are more likely to bluff in NEV than in PEV, as shown in Table 2. Specification (2)
of Table 5 considers only the behavior of AL players making demands in the revealing range. As
shown in the lower portion of the table, conditional on being in the revealing range, AL demands
adjust one to one with the shift in JL between treatments. 15
As a final point, we consider how effectively AL players bluff. Specification (3) of Table
5 considers only demands that are in the semi-pooling region. If AH and bluffing AL players
behave identically, then one would expect the coefficient for High to equal 0, but it is not.
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Because AH players overwhelmingly make demands in the semi-pooling region as shown in Table 2, we do not
provide separate analysis of AH demands conditional on being in the semi-pooling region, as those results are
effectively the same as the results in specification (1) of Table 5.
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Instead, AH players demand 59.15 more than bluffing AL players in the PEV treatment. The lower
portion of the table again confirms that AH players adjust their demand one for one with the
change in JH. In the NEV treatment, bluffing AL players reduce their demands by 100 on average
as shown in the lower portion of the table, meaning that the gap between the demands of the two
player types persists in this treatment too. Interestingly, the coefficient on PEV+ is statistically
larger than 100 indicating that bluffing demands are closer to AH demands in that treatment, but
still differ by 59.15 – 26.48 = 32.67. While AL players are not fully masking their decision to
bluff in any treatment, B players are apparently unaware of this pattern as they reject larger
demands more frequently than smaller demands within the semi-pooling range as shown in
specification (4) of Table 4. A comparison of the payoffs for AL players who bluff relative to
those who make a revealing demand shows that bluffing is profitable in NEV. The expected
payoff from bluffing averages –31.19, –71.93, and +30.39 for PEV, PEV+, and NEV,
respectively. The higher rejection rate of revealing demands in NEV makes bluffing relatively
more attractive and there is a limited increase in bluffing by AL as a result. The greater
prevalence of bluffing in the NEV treatment and the fact that most AL drop their suit in the face
of rejection both raise the benefit to B of rejecting demands in the semi-pooling region, but B
fails to respond with a higher rejection rate. Overall, in the NEV treatment we only observe
partial movements in the direction of theory.

6. Discussion
In some ways, the introduction of NEV suits impacts behavior in a manner consistent with the
theoretical predictions of the model. A large majority of AL players drop their suit in the face of
rejection in the NEV treatment. There is a sizeable increase in the rejection rate for revealing
demands in the NEV treatment. There is also evidence of an increase in bluffing behavior by AL
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in the NEV treatment. However, there are important interrelated ways in which behavior clearly
deviates from the predictions of theory.
One way in which behavior in the NEV treatment does not match the theoretical predictions
is that the dispute rate is lower, rather than higher as compared to the PEV and PEV+ treatments.
Specifically, the dispute rates in the PEV and PEV+ treatments are considerably above their
predicted values, while the rate for NEV is near its predicted value. In part this pattern is driven
by the fact that in three quarters of suits involving NEV, AL players drop their suit when rejected.
It is also due to there being excess disputes stemming from the rejection of revealing demands in
PEV and PEV+. In addition, demands in the bluffing range are rejected more frequently than
predicted in PEV and PEV+, so bluffing AL players have excess disputes in those treatments,
whereas in NEV many AL players caught bluffing drop the suit. The mechanism by which the
dispute rate is to rise under NEV is via a higher (100%) rejection rate on high demands which
leads all AH to proceed to trial. Contra the theory, rejection of demands in the bluffing range is no
more frequent in NEV compared to PEV or PEV+, so the higher dispute rate for AH does not occur.
A related way in which behavior does not follow the theoretical predictions is that signaling
does not completely unravel under NEV. This is driven by the fact that a quarter of the time AL
players in the NEV treatment proceed with the dispute in the face of a rejection, thereby weakening
the incentive for B to reject all demands. Since a majority of revealing demands are accepted in
the NEV treatment, there remains a substantial incentive for AL to make such a demand. In turn,
because there is only a small increase in bluffing behavior, there is a substantial probability that a
high demand is made by AH as in the other treatments.
So why might a fourth of AL players proceed to a dispute even when they receive a negative
payoff from doing so? One possibility is spite under which a player receives a positive benefit
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from inflicting costs on their opponent. Guha (2016, 2019) incorporates spite in models with
symmetric information and finds spite leads to more disputes, since it offers a means to inflict
costs on an opponent. In Appendix B, we similarly incorporate spite into our model with
asymmetric information in a signaling game. In our signaling game, it remains true that spite leads
to more disputes as long as plaintiff’s can only have PEV suits. However, spite relaxes the
plaintiff’s credibility condition, making it more likely that she will proceed to trial in the face of a
rejection even over some ranges where the monetary payoff is negative.
In particular, if we let µ be the benefit that the plaintiff receives per dollar of inflicted cost
on the defendant, the credibility constraint becomes µ(JL + CB) + JL – CA > 0 compared with the
constraint JL – CA > 0 in the absence of spite. For our experimental parameters, we would require

µ ≥ 1/3 for the credibility condition to continue to hold in the NEV treatment. If spite allows the
credibility condition to hold, then we do not have the predicted breakdown of the signaling
equilibria and, contra Guha (2016, 2019), spite can actually lower dispute rates.
As shown in (B3) of Appendix B, the existence of spite raises the dispute rate on demands
in the semi-pooling range, assuming the credibility constraint holds sans spite. For our PEV
parameters, the predicted dispute rate on the highest possible semi-pooling demand is 60%, while
the observed dispute rates on such demands are in the neighborhood of 75-80%. While this does
not constitute a test for spite, it is consistent with such a motive.
We do note that if our plaintiffs are motivated by spite, it is not universal as AL players
drop their NEV suits most of the time in face of a rejected demand. Of course, since we did not
design the experiment to test for spite, we cannot rule out the possibility that some other factor is
playing a role in NEV suits not being dropped. We see this as an important avenue for future
research.

24

7. Conclusion
The theoretical litigation literature provides a robust prediction that the presence of NEV suits will
raise the dispute rate, perhaps by a great deal. In the laboratory, we study such an environment
and, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to do so. Our key finding is at odds with
the theoretical literature as we find that the dispute rate actually falls when NEV suits are possible.
The behavior of our experimental subjects clearly changes in our NEV treatment as
compared to the other two treatments, but the magnitude of these changes is less, sometimes much
less, than the predictions of theory. Most importantly, while many subjects with NEV suits drop
their case in the face of rejection, 25% of the time such cases are not dropped. The rejection rate
on revealing demands in the NEV treatment rises, but only to 40%, which is well shy of the 100%
prediction. Bluffing increases, but by much less than predicted. For one key prediction, that dispute
rates on high demands will rise to 100%, there is no movement in the direction predicted by theory.
In short, while there is some unraveling of the signaling equilibrium, this occurs to a much smaller
degree than predicted by theory.
While our experiment was not designed to identify why observed behavior differs from the
theoretical predictions, one plausible explanation is plaintiff spite. Specifically, spite can help
maintain a credible threat to proceed to trial with an NEV suit in the face of rejection. The potential
for spite to lower dispute rates in our setting contrasts with previous theoretical incorporations of
spite. It remains for future experimental work to determine the robustness of our results and to
verify what role if any spite may play.
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Appendix A: Subject Instructions and Quiz
Subjects received a sheet of paper with the following instructions, which were also displayed on
their computer screens and read aloud.

INSTRUCTIONS
This is a study about decision-making. Please pay careful attention as we proceed through the
instructions as they explain how your payment will be determined. You will be paid in cash at
the end of the study. If you have a question at any point, please raise your hand. Otherwise, you
should not talk or communicate with anyone during the study. Also, please take a moment to
make sure your phone and other electronics are turned off and put away.
You are in a group of 8 people. Everyone in the group has been assigned a role as a “Person A” or a
“Person B” and half of the group has been assigned to each role. Your role will be displayed on your
computer screen. You will maintain the same role throughout the study.
Today's study will consist of several "rounds". At the start of each round, you will be randomly and
anonymously paired with a person in the other role. Therefore, one person in the pair will be "Person
A" and the other will be "Person B". During a round, Person A’s payoff and Person B’s cost will be
determined. These payoffs and costs will determine each person’s earnings:
Person A’s earnings. At the end of the study the computer will sum Person A’s payoffs from all
rounds. This total is divided by 1000, and the result is Person A’s earnings in U.S. dollars:
(Sum of Person A’s Payoffs from all rounds) ÷ 1000 = Person A’s U.S. dollar earnings.
Note that a higher payoff in a given round increases Person A's earnings from the study.
Person B’s earnings. At the end of the study, the computer sums Person B’s costs from all rounds.
This sum is subtracted from Person B’s Endowment. This difference is divided by 1000, and the result
is Person B's earnings in U.S. dollars:
(Person B’s Endowment – sum of B’s Costs from all rounds) ÷ 1000 = Person B’s U.S. dollar
earnings.
Note that a higher cost in a given round decreases Person B's earnings from the study. Also note that
Person B will know the value of Person B’s Endowment but Person A will not.
In a moment, we will describe the steps of a round. We will refer to outcome H and outcome L, where
H and L are numbers and H is greater than L. At the beginning of each round, the computer will
inform everyone of the values of H and L that are applicable for the round. H and L will change
periodically during the experiment. Later in a round, the computer will determine if the actual
outcome for a specific pair is H or L for that round. Every round, the computer will go through the
process of determining the outcome separately for each pair.
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Steps of a Round.
1. Person A and Person B are randomly and anonymously paired and informed of the values of
outcome H and outcome L which are potentially applicable for the round.
2. For each pair, the computer determines whether outcome H or outcome L applies for the round.
There is a 2/3 chance that outcome L is selected and a 1/3 chance that outcome H is selected. The
outcome that is selected is then displayed on Person A’s computer screen, but not on Person
B’s computer screen.
3. Person A submits a Request to Person B. All Requests must be whole numbers between 0 and
900. After A enters a Request and clicks the Submit button, the Request is displayed on each
person’s computer screen. After viewing the Request, B clicks either the “Accept” or “Not
Accept” button.
If B “Accepts” the Request, the round ends for that pair. Both A’s payoff and B’s cost for the
round are determined by the Request:
A’s payoff for the round = A’s Request.
B’s cost for the round = A’s Request.
If B does “Not Accept” A’s Request, the round proceeds to step 4.
4. Person A decides whether to “Stop” or to have the computer “Verify” the outcome which applies
for the round.
If Person A chooses “Stop”, the round ends for that pair. Both A’s payoff and B’s cost for the
round are 0:
A’s payoff for the round = 0.
B’s cost for the round = 0.
If Person A decides to have the computer “Verify” the outcome, then we proceed to step 5.
5. When the computer is used to verify the outcome, both Person A and Person B incur a fee of 100
and the computer reveals the outcome that applies to the round for the pair. The round ends for
that pair. Both A’s payoff and B’s cost for the round are determined by the outcome and the fee:
If outcome H applies to the round
A’s payoff for the round = H - 100.
B’s cost for the round = H + 100.
If outcome L applies to the round
A’s payoff for the round = L - 100.
B’s cost for the round = L + 100.
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After all pairs have completed a round, new pairs will be formed randomly and anonymously,
and the next round will begin. The values of H and L can change from round to round so you
should be sure to check the values of H and L at the start of each round.
Are there any questions?
We will now take a short quiz before beginning the experiment.
Subjects answered the following comprehension quiz on the computer.
Quiz Screen #1

Quiz Screen #2
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Appendix B. Litigation Model with Spite

Here we modify model from Section 3 to include the possibility of spite on the part of the
plaintiff. This model will demonstrate how spite can prevent the signaling model from
unraveling even when the monetary payoffs indicate that AL players have an NEV suit. The
sequence of the game is as specified in Section 3. To keep our model simple, we only consider
possible spite borne by the plaintiff towards the defendant. A spiteful plaintiff potentially
perceives a benefit from inflicting costs upon the defendant. Following Guha (2016, 2019) we
assume this benefit equals a proportion µ > 0 of the costs borne by the defendant. Stage 3 and
stage 5 of our previously specified game are amended as follows:

Stage 3. Player B decides to accept or reject the demand. If it is accepted, the game ends. Player
A’s payoff is S(1+µ) and player B’s payoff is –S. If the demand is rejected, the game proceeds to
stage 4.
Stage 5. At trial, a plaintiff of type Ai with i ∈{H, L} receives the monetary award Ji. The
plaintiff’s payoff is (1+µ)Ji + µCB – CA and the defendant’s payoff is –(Ji+CB).

First, consider the parameter restriction that allows us to eliminate the possibility of a
pure strategy separating equilibrium. If there is a dispute, AH would receive a payoff of (1+µ)JH
+ µCB – CA. If the pooling demand S is accepted, AH receives (1+µ)S. Under the lowest possible
pooling demand, (1+µ)S equals the AH dispute payoff. The lowest possible pooling demand is S
= JH+CB – (CA + CB)/(1+µ). Player B would reject this demand if JH+CB – (CA + CB)/(1+µ) ≥
p(JH +CB) + (1-p)(JL +CB), where the right-hand side of this expression is his expected cost at
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trial when a pooling demand is rejected. If he rejects the lowest possible pooling demand, he will
reject all possible pooling demands. Rearranging our expression we can conclude the pooling is
not possible if

(1 − p )( J H − J L )(1 + µ ) ≥ C A + CB .

(B1)

Note that a positive value of the spite parameter µ makes it more likely that this condition will
hold. Thus, if the condition in (1) holds, the condition in (B1) will necessarily hold. The demands
in (2a) and (2b) are unchanged, because they reflect player B costs of arbitration and do not
involve a spite term, but the lower bound for the semi-pooling demand SSP is now reflected in the
following:
SH – (CA + CB)/ (1 + µ ) ≤ SSP ≤ SH

(B2)

Expression (B2) implies a smaller range for semi-pooling demands than (2c). A semi-pooling
demand SSP must be rejected with a sufficiently high probability φ so as to make AL indifferent
between making this high demand or making the revealing demand SL. The rejection rate must
satisfy the following:

(1 + µ )( J L + CB ) =
(1 − φ )(1 + µ ) S SP + φ ([1 + µ ]J L + µ CB − C A ) .
Letting the expression above hold as an equality, (B3) gives the value of φ that is consistent with
a semi-pooling equilibrium with the high demand SSP:

φ=

(1 + µ )( S SP − J L − CB )
.
(1 + µ )( S SP − J L ) + C A − µ CB

(B3)
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It is easy to show that ∂φ/∂µ > 0, so that the existence of spite raises the rejection rate φ
conditional on the value of the semi-pooling demand, SSP. Without spite, the gap between a semipooling demand and low demand is SSP – JL. With spite, this gap is (1+µ)( SSP – JL). Thus, there
is a greater temptation for AL to bluff by making a higher demand. Therefore, a given semipooling demand must be rejected more frequently to prevent AL from making such a demand.
Note that the bluffing probability in (4) is not affected because this probability is a function of
B’s costs only and these do not include the spite term.
The lowest pooling demand that AH would accept is S = JH+CB – (CA + CB)/(1+µ). Now,
if this demand is rejected, all AL drop the suit, so if p(JH + CB) ≤ JH+CB – (CA + CB)/(1+µ),
pooling is not possible. This may be expressed as

(1 − p )( J H + CB )(1 + µ ) ≥ C A + CB .

(B4)

If (B1) holds, then equation (B4) will also hold. If this condition holds, we cannot have pure
strategy pooling.
Absent spite, the credibility constraint for AL is JL – CA > 0. In the presence of spite, this
condition is (1+µ)JL + µCB – CA > 0. Thus, the credibility constraint is more likely to hold in the
presence of spite. Under condition (A5), the credibility condition holds when there is spite, but
not in the absence of spite:

J L − C A < 0 < (1 + µ ) J L + µ CB − C A

(A5)

Since dispute rates may be significantly higher when the credibility condition fails, we have a set
of circumstances under which spite may reduce dispute rates. In Guha (2016, 2019), spite can
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lead to disputes even in the presence of symmetric information. Spite will raise dispute rates in a
standard signaling model, when the credibility condition holds absent spite. However, if the
credibility condition fails absent spite, the presence of spite has the potential to lower the dispute
rate if it can ensure that AL plaintiffs have a credible threat to proceed to trial.
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